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THE FUTURE OF NONDELEGATION:
RESURRECTING THE DOCTRINE THROUGH A
NOVEL BALANCING TEST
Jarrod Alec Greth*

ABSTRACT
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States
was split 4 - 4 on the question of nondelegation. With a vacancy
on the Bench, half of the Court took no issue with Congress
delegating nearly unlimited discretion to the United States
Attorney General over the enforcement and applicability of the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act to offenders whose
crimes preceded the Act’s enactment. The other half of the Court
saw this grant of vast power as a violation of the nondelegation
doctrine; the idea that Congress may not delegate its Article I lawmaking powers to any other branch of government. The Court has
not struck down a law on nondelegation grounds since before the
New Deal Era. This could soon change with the new majority on
the Court. By adopting a novel balancing test, known as the major
rules doctrine, this new Court could resurrect the spirit of the
nondelegation doctrine and begin to return federal administrative
law to a more interstitial role under a more traditional
understanding of separation of powers.
By flipping the analysis from first considering the power
delegating statute to now beginning with the promulgated
administrative rule, the Court will be able to rein in actions taken
by executive agencies which have far-reaching economic,
political, or otherwise contentious effects. The implications of this
reversal of nearly a century’s worth of judicial deference to
Congress and the various administrative agencies include (1)
more deliberate law-making by Congress, (2) asymmetric effects
across administrative agencies, and (3) increased accountability
for regulation at the federal level.
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INTRODUCTION
The new majority of the Supreme Court of the United States has signaled
that it has a problem with the Court’s nearly century-long embrace of broad
administrative rule-making. The last administrative rule that the Court found to
violate the nondelegation doctrine—the principle that Congress may not delegate its
law-making powers which are articulated in Article I of the United States
Constitution to another branch of government—was in 1935 when the Court struck
down a rule which made it a federal crime for butchers to allow customers to select
their chickens for slaughter.1 Since then, the Court has been exceedingly permissive
towards Congress in its delegation of authority to the executive as well as deferential
to the various administrative agencies’ interpretations of their own scope of
authority.2
With the current majority of the Court presumably being inclined to give a
more originalist interpretation of Article I when answering a question of
congressional delegation of power and administrative rule-making, the
nondelegation doctrine might soon enjoy a renaissance. This impending shift has
been signaled in the recent case of Gundy v. United States.3
In Gundy, the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether Congress
overstepped its constitutionally prescribed boundaries when it delegated seemingly
unlimited discretion to the Attorney General in determining the applicability of the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) to offenders whose
convictions preceded the legislation’s enactment.4 In a 5-3 plurality (Justice
Kavanaugh was not yet on the Court at the time of argument), the statute in question
was upheld as not being a violation of the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Kagan,
who largely relied on the statutory construction the Court used in Reynolds v. United
States,5 looked not only to the Court’s precedents which by and large have upheld
vast delegation of power by Congress to administrative agencies but also to the
legislative history of SORNA. Kagan, along with Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor concluded not only that Congress intended for SORNA to apply to PreAct offenders, but also that the codification of unlimited discretion by the Attorney
General in applying that intent was not a violation of the Legislative Vesting Clause
in Article I of the Constitution.6
Dissenting, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, along with Chief Justice Roberts,
made an argument for why such broad discretion by an executive officer, such as the
Attorney General, in the applicability of a criminal statute is incongruent with the
separation of powers that is articulated in the Constitution.7 Essentially, the dissent’s
argument was that the notion of deciding who is subject to criminal codes is a lawmaking determination, not a rule-making function. Justice Alito concurred in the
judgement but stated that he was willing to reconsider the deferential approach that
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
588 U.S. ___ (2019).
588 U.S. ___ (slip op. at 1).
565 U.S. 432 (2012).
Gundy, 588 U.S. ___ (slip op. at 6); See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
Id. (slip op. at 6) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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the Court has taken to the question of nondelegation for the better part of the 20th
century, if a majority of the Court felt so inclined.8
Justice Kavanaugh will likely be the tie-breaking vote in a future
nondelegation case.9 During his tenure on the D.C. Circuit of Appeals, Kavanaugh
only tangentially addressed the issue of nondelegation in one case. In United States
Telecom Association v. FCC,10 the Court of Appeals considered granting a rehearing
en banc on a contest against the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”)
2015 Open Internet Order (commonly referred to as ‘Net Neutrality’). Though the
court issued a per curiam denial of rehearing, Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion
where he invoked the major rules doctrine—a doctrine developed by the Supreme
Court which relates to the principle of nondelegation—as grounds for why this FCC
rule might be unconstitutional.11 This dissent could be a signal for how Kavanaugh
might approach administrative rules and the scope of both congressional and
executive power in a future nondelegation case.
This 4-4 split on the question of the nondelegation doctrine raises the
following questions: (1) in what direction will the Court go, (2) if the Court decides
to revitalize the nondelegation doctrine, what new test will the Court apply when
considering whether Congress has crossed the line in the sand drawn by Article I;
and (3) what are the implications of this potential new standard with regards to the
broad rule-making authority enjoyed by the numerous administrative agencies?
This note will address the above questions as follows: Part I will discuss the
constitutional foundations of and relevant precedents to the nondelegation doctrine.
Part II will discuss the current legal standards of administrative law, namely Chevron
and how it pertains to the nondelegation doctrine. Part III will explore the origins of
the major rules doctrine, while Part IV will explore the doctrine’s application and
implications as well as how it interacts with the nondelegation doctrine insofar as it
restricts far-reaching administrative rule-making while not addressing the
constitutionally permissible scope congressional delegation of power. Finally, Part
V will consider the potential salutary effect that that a judicial rule such as the major
rules doctrine will have on how Congress drafts statutes.
BACKGROUND
I.

Constitutional Foundation and Relevant Precedents

The nondelegation doctrine is derived from Article I, Section One, of the
United States Constitution, which states, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.”12 The idea is that this section of the Constitution vests
all legislative power in Congress and Congress may not delegate that law-making
8. Id. (slip op. at 1) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. Justice Kavanaugh recently signaled his support for reconsidering the Court’s approach to the
nondelegation doctrine in a denial of certiorari statement, see Paul v. United States, 589 U.S. ___ (No.
17-8830) (2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J.) (“Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s
nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases.”).
10. 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
11. Id. at 417–18.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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power away. Though there is no clause in the Constitution which specifically states
that Congress may not delegate law-making power to another branch of government,
this is a principle that is generally understood to be the case, especially amongst
proponents of originalism.13 The doctrine is derived from the implicit notion that the
first three articles of the U.S. Constitution deliberately vest specific powers in the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government, and that in
doing so the Framers intended each particular power to be siloed in the respective
branches.14 Unsurprisingly, this understanding of the Framers’ original intent comes
from The Federalist Papers, particularly those penned by James Madison.15 Madison
described the separation of powers laid out in the Constitution as “necessary” to our
constitutional structure.16 Essential to the Framers’ very conception of the separation
of powers is the notion that no branch may delegate its Constitutionally enumerated
powers to another branch.
Prior to the New Deal and the advent of administrative governance, the
United States Supreme Court (“the Court”) enforced this principle rather faithfully.17
The Court’s first full discussion of the nondelegation doctrine was in Wayman v.
Southard.18 In the Court’s majority opinion, Chief Justice Marshall highlighted that
“[t]he legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the
law.”19 Marshall also asserted that Congress may not delegate powers which are
“strictly and exclusively legislative.20 This is the judicial genesis of the
nondelegation doctrine.
This formulation of the separation of powers begs the question: where does
legislative power end and executive (or judicial) power begin? Sticking to a more
originalist approach in answering this question, it is important to keep in mind the
text-based distinctions between the legislative powers enumerated in Article I and
the executive powers described in Article II.21 Article II vests the executive power
in a President of the United States.22 The scope of what exactly this entails is the
subject of much judicial and scholarly debate. Article II is explicit in describing what
some of these executive powers are, such as the power to act as Commander-in-Chief

13. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335–36 (2002).
14. Id. at 337.
15. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison).
16. The Federalist No. 51, at 288 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (“The necessary
partition of power among the several departments laid down in the Constitution.”).
17. Michael Sebring, The Major Rules Doctrine: How Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Novel
Doctrine Can Bridge the Gap between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 189, 193 (2018) (discussing how since the New Deal, the application of the nondelegation
doctrine has been “crimped” to allow the growth of modern administrative governance).
18. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
19. Id. at 46.
20. Id. at 42.
21. Utilizing a more textualist and originalist approach is appropriate in the context of this note, as
the current majority on the Court is manifestly sympathetic to these arguments and legal theories. As such,
looking at the nondelegation doctrine through this lens will provide insight into the Court’s reasoning
moving forward.
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).
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of the Armed Forces23 and the power to appoint judges and officers.24 Article II also
articulates that Congress by law may vest the appointment of “inferior officers” in
the President.25 This means that even the most hardnosed textualist must
acknowledge that Congress may delegate some power to the president via statute.
The current accepted position of the Court is that Congress may delegate
authority to the executive so long as the delegating legislative act lays down an
“intelligible principle” by which the person or agency is directed to conform.26 This
language comes from Mistretta v. United States, where the Court weighed in on the
constitutionality of criminal sentencing guidelines promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission. Mistretta gives both Congress and the executive wide
discretion in the types of power they are able to wield.
It seems that under the Minstretta rule the only limiting principle on
Congress’s ability to delegate power to the executive is that the Court must find an
“intelligible principle” in the statute to which the executive is directed to conform.
This rule will inevitably come to odds with a majority who is more interested in
preserving an originalist understanding of the separation of powers than was the
majority in the Mistretta court. A Court which gives more credence to the structural
separation of powers, as understood by the Framers, will likely take umbrage with
Congress passing statutes which delegate what it sees as law-making power to the
various administrative agencies– regardless of how “intelligible” the statute is. In
other words, there must be some other limiting principle beyond merely an
“intelligible” method by which the delegated power is conveyed.
This is precisely the issue raised by the dissent in Gundy. The first objection
raised in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is that the Constitution vests law-making power
in Congress, not in any administrative agency or executive branch official.27 This
insistence that the Constitution restricts the permissible scope of Congress’s ability
to delegate power goes further than Justice Scalia’s dissent did in Reynolds.28 In
Reynolds, the Court was required to interpret the same statute that was at issue in
Gundy, 34 U.S.C. Section 20913(d).29 In Reynolds the Court upheld the statute 7-2,
with Justices Scalia and Ginsburg dissenting. There, the dissent’s primary issue was

23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 1.
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 2.
25. Id.
26. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (Here, the Court illustrates for the first time that so
long as legislation sets forth an “intelligible principle” for which to guide a person or administrative body,
the delegation of such power is constitutionally sound.); The Court also equates an “intelligible principle”
to “minimum standards.” Id. at 379.
27. Gundy, 588 U.S. ___ (slip op. at 1) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution promises that
only people’s elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty. Yet the statute before
us scrambles that design. It purports to endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write his
own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens . . . . [I]f a single executive branch official
can write laws restricting the liberty of this group of persons, what does that mean for the next?”).
28. Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2018) (“The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of
this chapter . . . and to prescribe rules of the registration of any such sex offender.”).
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with the majority’s interpretation of the phrase “specify the applicability.”30 Though
the dissent mentioned that the constitutionality of a criminal statute granting the
Attorney General unlimited discretion in deciding to whom it applies is suspect,31
this observation seems almost secondary. The Court’s statutory interpretation of
§20913(d) was a significant factor in the majority’s argument in Gundy.
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Gundy addresses the issue of
nondelegation in two ways: (1) by citing precedent that a delegation of power is
constitutional as long as Congress sets out an intelligible principle to guide the
delegee’s exercise of authority,32 and (2) by interpreting the statute to mean that
Congress intended for SORNA to apply to pre-Act offenders. If Congress so
intended, this would mean that the Attorney General never had unlimited discretion
in the application of SORNA, thus disposing of the nondelegation issue entirely.
II.

Chevron Deference and Nondelegation

Much of the Court’s extant willingness to defer to the judgement of
administrative agencies comes from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.33 The Chevron doctrine governs much of modern
administrative jurisprudence.34 The Chevron doctrine is a judicial mechanism
designed to interpret statutory ambiguities by first considering whether Congress has
spoken directly to the issue, and then deferring to an administrative agency’s
interpretation of the statute, so long as the interpretation is reasonable.35
Implicit in the Chevron doctrine is the idea that Congress has the power to
“turn off” the judicial deference to administrative agency interpretation simply by
passing unambiguous statutes with clear intent.36 The Court has in recent years began
limiting Chevron’s application, which further presents an opening for those seeking
a revival of the nondelegation doctrine.37 For example, in United States v. Mead38
the Court rejected the U.S. Customs Service’s interpretation of a federal tariff
schedule, a statute prescribed by Congress, as applied to certain categories of goods.
The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to delegate the power to make
“force of law” rulings to the U.S. Customs Service.39
Another limitation on the application of Chevron deference is the major
questions doctrine. The basic idea behind the major questions doctrine is that
Congress does not implicitly delegate the power to make “extraordinarily” important
30. Reynolds, 565 U.S. 432, 448 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not share the Court’s belief that to
‘specify the applicability’ more naturally means, in the present context, to ‘make applicable’ . . . .”).
31. Id. at 450.
32. Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. ___ (slip op. at 3) (2019) (citing Witman v. American Trucking
Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474–75).
33. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
34. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
206 (2001) (“In the beginning . . . there was Chevron.”).
35. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J.
511, 512 (1989).
36. Barron, supra note 34, at 212.
37. Sebring, supra note 17, at 199.
38. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
39. Id. at 231–32.
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policy choices to administrative agencies when it enacts ambiguous statutes.40 Said
another way: if a statute is ambiguous enough to raise “major questions” of economic
or political significance, rules promulgated by administrative agencies pursuant to
the enforcement of these statutes are not granted Chevron deference. Alongside the
major questions doctrine is a more contemporary legal doctrine, which stems from
the same policy interests but considers the specific implications of the administrative
rule under review. This is known as the major rules doctrine.
III.

The Major Rules Doctrine

In United States Telecom Association v. FCC,41 the District of Columbia
Circuit Court reviewed a challenge to the FCC’s “net neutrality” rule. This new rule
issued by the FCC sought to reclassify internet service providers as engaging in
telecommunication rather than being information services.42 This rule change carried
with it substantial regulatory and policy implications, as telecommunications are
treated very differently from information services under federal law.43 The challenge
to the rule alleged that Congress had not authorized the FCC to regulate the internet
service providers in this manner.44 The D.C. Circuit Court ultimately denied the
challenge an en banc rehearing, however Judge Kavanaugh issued a dissent in the
decision where he articulated the “major rules” doctrine as a rationale for why the
net neutrality rule should be struck down.45 Essentially, the major rules doctrine
considers several factors including (1) economic impact of the rule, (2) the number
of people or parties affected, (3) the presence of highly mobilized interest groups,
(4) intense public focus, (5) political engagement, and (6) fundamental statutory
transformation.46 These factors are considered and weighed against the express
authority Congress has granted the promulgating agency when considering if the rule
should be granted Chevron deference.47 A significant difference between the major
questions doctrine and the major rules doctrine is that while the major questions
doctrine merely asks that questioned administrative rules carrying major political
and economic significance be reviewed de novo prior to being granted Chevron
deference; the major rules doctrine asserts that rules which are found to be “major”
in light of considering the above six factors are prima facie violative of the
nondelegation doctrine.48 Considering both the underlying policy interests and
Justice Kavanaugh’s previous predilection towards the major rules doctrine, as
articulated in his United States Telecom Ass’n dissent, this could be the rule and
approach the Court implements moving forward in nondelegation cases.

40. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (where the Court reiterated that questions
of “deep economic and political significant” are not granted Chevron deference); See also RICHARD
MURPHY, 33 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8429 (2d ed.).
41. 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
42. Id. at 383.
43. See id. at 384.
44. See id. at 383.
45. United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 422–24.
47. See id.
48. See Sebring, supra note 17, at 212.
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ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS
IV.

Defining a Major Rule

If the Court resurrects the nondelegation doctrine through a balancing test
like the major rules doctrine, the effect would not be the decimation of the
administrative state but rather would require that administrative agencies promulgate
rules that serve more as gap-fillers in congressionally passed policy rather than rules
which usurp Congress’s Article I powers. This is not to say that every delegation of
power by Congress would be struck down. The major rules doctrine is grounded in
two overlapping presumptions: “(1) a separation of powers-based presumption
against the delegation of major lawmaking authority from Congress to the Executive
Branch; and (2) a presumption that Congress intends to make major policy decisions
itself.”49 These principles leave room for administrative discretion not only in terms
of interpreting the statutes which delegate authority, but also in terms of
administrative policy choice.
This approach addresses the constitutional balance of law-making and rulemaking powers by analyzing the administrative rule rather than the statute it is
promulgated under. This is distinctly different from the old nondelegation doctrine
employed in the early 20th century,50 which approached the issue from the opposite
direction; by looking at the statute to determine if Congress’s law-making power had
been improperly delegated to the Executive Branch. By flipping how the issue of
nondelegation is approached to begin with the administrative rule, the Court will be
able to rein in vast administrative power without having to overturn Chevron.
Applying the major rules doctrine to the scenario in Gundy requires a few
assumptions to be made. First, the focus in the question presented needs to shift from
the constitutionality of 34 U.S.C. Section 20913(d) (2018)51 to the constitutionality
of a particular rule set forth by the Department of Justice. For the sake of argument,
consider a rule like the one made by Attorney General Mukasey in 2008;52 this rule
required pre-Act offenders to comply with SORNA fully, meaning that the
Department of Justice retroactively extended the reach of SORNA boundlessly. As
a pre-Act offender, the petitioner in Gundy was certainly subjected to complying
with 73 Fed. Reg. 38030. If the Court were to apply a major rules analysis to this
rule, it would consider: (1) the economic impact of the rule, (2) the number of people
or parties affected, (3) the presence of highly mobilized interest groups, (4) the
intensity of public focus, (5) political engagement around the subject matter of the
rule, and (6) fundamental statutory transformation.53
Economic Impact. There certainly would be economic costs associated with
retroactively requiring the registration and notification of all individuals who are

49. United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419.
50. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
51. Which states: “The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the
requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter . . . and to
prescribe rules for the registration of an such sex offender.”
52. The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030
(July 2, 2008).
53. United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422–424.
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considered sex offenders under SORNA whose convictions preceded the passage of
the Act. These costs would be borne by both the government and by the applicable
individuals. The government would have the costs of notification, of determining
who to notify, and of ensuring registration. One of the concerns when drafting
SORNA was the costly burden that would be imposed on the states and local
governments, who would need to overhaul their current sex offender registration
schemes, if and when SORNA was to be applied to pre-Act offenders.54 Additionally,
the pre-Act offenders would incur the criminal costs associated with failure to
register, if they either do not receive notice that they must register, or willfully fail
to comply.
The number of people or parties affected. At the time SORNA was passed
there were a half-million pre-Act offenders.55 Though this is not necessarily a
substantial block of the country’s population, it still is a substantial number of people
in absolute terms.
The presence of highly mobilized interest groups. After the Court granted
certiorari to Gundy, multiple interest groups filed amicus briefs with the Court.56
These interest groups ranged from civil liberties groups like the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Institute for Justice, to the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, to the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.57 This
demonstrates that a wide range of varying public interests are at play in this matter,
which further indicates that a large number of people are potentially affected by the
balance of power issue that the Court is grappling with.
The intensity of public focus. While there is not necessarily evidence of a
huge swell of public indignation towards SORNA’s and the Department of Justice’s
treatment of sex offenders, that is not to say that the implication of the underlying
principles of how our legal system goes about deciding who regulates who is not a
matter of public focus. This is illustrated by the fact that the range of amici curiae
filed in Gundy was so eclectic.58
Political Engagement. The legal treatment of sex offenders is certainly a
topic of great political engagement. The topic is one which garners strong feelings
by those who fear the effect that such individuals might have on public safety, by
those who view perpetrators of such crimes with disgust, as well as by those who
worry about the treatment of even the most reviled among the population.59 Exactly
what to do with and about those who commit crimes that elicit such strong emotions
is an ongoing discussion in American society.
Fundamental statutory transformation. The statute granting the Attorney
General the authority to prescribe rules regarding the applicability of SORNA to preAct offenders reads:

54. Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. ___ (slip op. at 2-3) (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
55. Id., 588 U.S. ___, (slip op. at 1) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
56. See
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/gundy-v-united-states
[https://perma.cc/75DQ-264S].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Cf. Brief of Scholars Whose Work Includes Sex Offense Studies as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Gundy v. U.S., 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (No. 17-6086).
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The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the
applicability of the requirements of this title to sex offenders
convicted before the enactment of this Act [enacted July 27, 2006]
or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe
rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other
categories of sex offenders.60
Though the language of this statute is open to varying interpretations, what is not
ambiguous is the fact that it grants the Attorney General wide discretion in the types
of rules he or she may promulgate under it. To that end, the Mukasey rule’s
interpretation does not fundamentally transform the statute. Any intelligible rule
would arguably be permitted under a statute which grants such wide unambiguous
discretion.
In light of considering the six factors of the major rules test, it is not difficult
to see how the Court could reject a rule like the Mukasey rule in the context of Gundy.
The rule is far reaching, affects a substantial amount of people, drew the attention of
several interest groups, and there is substantial political engagement around the
subject matter. Additionally, though the rule does not seem to fundamentally
transform the statute, that is not dispositive. The current Court would more than
likely strike down such a rule under a major rules analysis when you consider the
dissent in Gundy as well as Justice Alito’s Concurrence. Though this approach differs
substantially from that of the dissent, which focuses on the statute rather than the
administrative rule, it reaches the same result but through a more narrowly tailored
exception to a pre-existing rule.
This approach is arguably more palatable to the critics of a reemergent
nondelegation doctrine, who emphasize the importance of preserving administrative
power in the interest of harnessing and utilizing the technical field expertise which
is housed within the various administrative agencies. By starting with the rule in
question when considering an issue of nondelegation, the Court could temper a
possible truncation of administrative power with an acknowledgement that certain
administrative functions require administrative discretion.
Thinking through possible future applications of the major rules doctrine
yields different results for different types of administrative agencies. Agencies
whose scope and regulatory purpose are of a highly technical nature would be the
most impervious to a nondelegation challenge. A piece of Chevron which will
survive an adoption of the major rules analysis is deference by the Court to an
administrative agency which has special expertise.61 This is because these rules
generally do not garner intense public focus or political engagement.
For example, suppose that the director of the National Hurricane Center
(NHC) wishes to promulgate a new rule that would modify how hurricanes are
categorized.62 The NHC is a division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

60. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2018).
61. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
370 (1986).
62. The NHC currently classifies hurricanes based on their wind speed.
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Administration (NOAA),63 which in turn is within the United States Department of
Commerce.64 There is no statute which expressly gives the Department of
Commerce, NOAA, or NHC the authority to categorize hurricanes; however, there
is a statute which creates the department of commerce,65 whose mission includes
“providing the data necessary to support commerce . . . “66 and one of the
fundamental activities of the NOAA is to provide weather information to the
public.67 Weather clearly can have a substantial effect on commerce. Forecasting and
providing accurate weather information requires a great deal of technical expertise.
This is something Congress cannot realistically be expected to do via statute; thus, it
has delegated authority to the Executive Branch. This delegation of power is
allowable under the major rules doctrine and nondelegation doctrine.
Administrative rules that, once implemented, evoke great public scrutiny
for perceived political reasons or even perceived economic impact would be more
likely to be struck down as violative of the major rules doctrine, even if the rule is
promulgated through an agency which historically has regulated highly technical
fields. Consider the rule currently being contemplated by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), which would ban the manufacture and sale of all flavored
e-cigarette products.68 The policy aim of the rule is to curb teen use of nicotine
products.69 The FDA is a federal agency of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services (“HHS”).70 The mission of HHS is to “[e]nhance and protect
the health and well-being of all Americans.”71 The FDA was created through an
express delegation of authority by Congress via the “Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.”72 The FDA would more than likely attempt to justify its proposed
ban on flavored e-cigarettes under subsection (b)(1) of Section 393.73

63. NHC
VISITOR
INFORMATION,
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutvisitor.shtml#loc
[https://perma.cc/B5YM-KYTG].
64. Bureaus and Offices, U.S. DEP’T. COMMERCE, https://www.commerce.gov/bureaus-and-offices
[https://perma.cc/8YBC-Z9G3].
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1501 (2018); See also 5 U.S.C. § 591 (2018).
66. About
Commerce,
U.S.
DEP’T.
COMMERCE,
https://www.commerce.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/8S5V-NUPY].
67. New Priorities for the 21st Century, NOAA’ STRATEGIC PLAN (June 10, 2016),
https://www.performance.noaa.gov/wp-content/uploads/FY05-10_NOAA_Strategic_Plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6V5-9L95].
68. Trump Administration Combating Epidemic of Youth E-Cigarette Use with Plan to Clear Market
of Unauthorized, Non-Tobacco-Flavored E-Cigarette Products, FDA (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/trump-administration-combating-epidemicyouth-e-cigarette-use-plan-clear-market-unauthorized-non [https://perma.cc/PQ2Z-X364].
69. Id.
70. Agencies
&
Offices,
HHS,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/hhs-agencies-andoffices/index.html [https://perma.cc/NC94-LXWF].
71. About HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/57TW-V6HP].
72. 21 U.S.C § 393 (2018).
73. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1) (2018) (“The Administration shall promote the public health by promptly
and efficiently reviewing clinical research and talking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated
products in a timely manner.”).
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Considering the six factors of a major rules doctrine analysis,74 the FDA’s
proposed e-cigarette ban seems to be most provocative of factors (1), (2), (5), and to
a lesser extent (6). Beginning by first looking at the potential economic impact of the
ban; the e-cigarette industry generated roughly $2,350,000,000 in the United States
in 2016.75 “Vape shops”76 may constitute as much as twenty percent of this market.77
That means that vape shops generate about $470,000,000 in revenue in the United
States, per annum. The effect of banning the sale of such a large part of this niche
industry’s product would have substantial effect on the industry’s nearly half a
billion-dollar annual revenue. As for the second fact, number of people affected, the
Centers for Disease Control that in 2014 there were about 3.7% of all adults in
America (approximately 9 million people) who used e-cigarettes daily or almost
daily.78 Following the logic of the application of the major rules factors to SORNA,79
if a half-million people might be considered a substantial number of people under a
major rules analysis, then nine million people affected by an administrative rule
would also trigger a concern under the same judicial test. Considering the fifth factor,
political engagement, the proposed ban on flavored e-cigarettes has stirred up a
considerable amount of political interest.80
Finally, consider the sixth factor: fundamental statutory transformation.
Though this is perhaps the weakest argument for how the proposed FDA rule
provokes heightened judicial scrutiny under a major rules analysis, it could be argued
that the rule misinterprets the meaning and purpose of 21 U.S.C. Section 393(b)(1).81
Section 393(b) outlines the mission and regulatory scope of the FDA. The FDA is
delegated the power, among others, to promote public health by efficiently reviewing
data and clinical research and taking appropriate steps to regulate the marketing of
products within its scope of authority.82 A potential argument that could be made

74. The factors being: (1) economic impact, (2) number of people affected, (3) the presence of highly
mobilized interest groups, (4) intensity of public focus, (5) political engagement, and (6) fundamental
statutory transformation.
75. Electronic Cigarettes (e-cigarettes) Dollar Sales in the United States, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/285143/us-e-cigarettes-dollar-sales [https://perma.cc/B347-AJQN].
76. Meaning boutique retailers who sell exclusively e-cigarettes and e-cigarette accessories.
77. E-Cigarettes: Facts, Stats, and Regulations, TRUTH INITIATIVE (Nov. 11, 2019),
https://truthinitiative.org/research-resources/emerging-tobacco-products/e-cigarettes-facts-stats-andregulations [https://perma.cc/8ECX-ERSY].
78. CHARLOTTE A. SCHOENBORN & RENEE M. GINDI, ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE USE AMONG
ADULTS:
UNITES
STATES,
2014,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db217.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FKB5-N6CL].
79. Where there were a half-million Pre-Act Offenders affected by the rule promulgated by the U.S.
Attorney General.
80. See Annie Karni, Maggie Haberman & Sheila Kaplan, Trump Retreats From Flavor Ban for ECigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/health/trump-vapingban.html [https://perma.cc/BYE2-NVBF]; See also Shannon Pettypiece, Trump Hosts Heated White
House Vaping Debate, NBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/whitehouse/trump-hosts-heated-white-house-vaping-debate-n1089891 [https://perma.cc/U6S9-P7LW].
81. Supra note 73.
82. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2018).
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against the proposed flavor ban is that since the vaping phenomena is so new83 and
the data are so disparate84 the FDA would be acting outside of the plain language of
Section 393(b). The argument could be made that since the health data pertaining to
vaping is so controversial, that acting on such data is not lending it to “efficient
review” or “promoting the public health” as articulated under the statute. Put another
way, until there is more conclusive data pertaining to the health risks and usage
trends of vaping, the FDA would be acting outside of its authority if the agency were
to implement such a wide sweeping ban on vaping products.
The counter to this argument is that even if the Court acknowledged that it
is factually true that the available data concerning vaping and e-cigarette use is too
scant to draw scientifically conclusions from, Section 393(b) should still be granted
Chevron deference. Under Chevron there is more than thirty years of precedent for
judicially mandated deference to administrative agency interpretation of its own
statutory grant of power. This is a very compelling argument, especially since the
Court would be asked to apply an alien construction of the power-delegating statute
in light of Chevron, despite its plain language ambiguity. However, the major rules
test is a balancing test of six factors, and no factor is dispositive. Even if the Court
found that the FDA’s proposed rule banning flavored e-cigarettes did not
fundamentally transform the power delegating statute, the proposed rule could still
plausibly fail a major rules analysis.
V.

Salutary Effect of Changing How Congress Drafts Statutes

The Court’s application of the major rules doctrine would, in effect, address
the issue of nondelegation while keeping intact the sort of administrative discretion
and freedom that many argue is necessary for a complex modern society’s
functioning. By flipping the approach of the analysis to require the administrative
rule to pass a factor analysis, rather than confronting power-delegating statutes head
on, the Court will be able to balance these interests.
This new approach will more than likely have an impact on how Congress
drafts statutes. If rules are being struck down as violative of the major rules doctrine,
this means that there are almost certainly great numbers of individuals affected by
the rule, there are large highly-mobilized interest groups either advocating for and/or
against the conduct being regulated, and (as such) there is great political engagement
around the topic. These forces can be assumed to be present in such a scenario
because the Court would necessarily have to consider them before striking down
such a rule. The passion and political energy of these groups and individuals will
then have to turn their sights to Congress in order for their desired ends to be met.
This can manifest in a few ways. One way is that political pressure will be put on
83. See Dennis Thompson, U.S. Smoking Rate Hits New Low, But Vaping Rises, WEBMD (Nov. 14,
2019), https://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/news/20191114/fewer-americans-than-ever-smokebut-vaping-poses-a-growing-threat-cdc#1 [https://perma.cc/N59G-2GVY].
84. Accord CDC, FDA, States Continue to Investigate Severe Pulmonary Disease Among People
Who Use E-cigarettes, CDC (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2019/s0821-cdc-fdastates-e-cigarettes.html [https://perma.cc/D9LC-JEZB]; Brad Rodu, Misty Math: FDA Claims About Teen
Vaping
Don’t
Add
Up,
REAL
CLEAR
PUBLIC
AFFAIRS
(Apr.
9,
2019),
https://www.realclearpublicaffairs.com/articles/2019/04/09/misty_math_fda_claims_about_teen_vaping
_dont_add_up.html [https://perma.cc/Z7HW-8XAZ].
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individual members of Congress to pass legislation in pursuance of these desired
outcomes. Hypothetically, under great pressure by their constituents,
congresspersons and senators, who hope to be reelected will act accordingly and will
draft and pass legislation that strives for these outcomes and results so desired by the
people.
Critics of this admittedly simplistic and idealistic view will counter by
saying that this is not what will actually happen. They will point to the other way in
which this refocusing of the politically engaged groups will manifest: lobbying. With
these mobilized interest groups focusing on Congress, the worry is that lobbying will
substantially increase and that members of the federal legislature will only further be
beholden to special interests.
The role of lobbying and special interests in the legislative process is an
important consideration. However, it is worth noting that as a factor in a major rules
analysis, the existence of interest groups precedes the question. The rule under
review would only be struck down under a major rules analysis if there already were
a presence of highly mobilized interest groups. Essentially, the problem of special
interests is independent of the goal of the nondelegation doctrine and though an
adoption of the major rules test will not mitigate this issue, it also will not exacerbate
it.
CONCLUSION
The nondelegation doctrine, which has laid largely dormant for nearly a
century in American constitutional law could very well enjoy a resurrection in the
21st century. In light of the Court’s most recent decision in Gundy and the past
decision-making and reasoning of the one voice on the Court who did not weigh in
on that decision; it is evident that the new Court is keen to go a different direction in
future cases concerning the scope of administrative rule-making power. The major
rules doctrine appears to be a prime candidate for what type of test and analysis the
new majority of the Court will employ in these future cases. By flipping the analysis
from looking at the affirmative power delegated by Congress via statute to instead
begin with the rule and consider the enumerated policy considerations laid out in the
major rules doctrine, the Court will be able to more clearly delineate rule-making
power from law-making power without undoing the entire foundation of the modern
administrative apparatus.
To be sure, there are still many issues and concerns about exactly what a
pivot such as the major rules doctrine could mean for both agencies and law-makers.
The scope of the application of this doctrine, for example, leaves room for subjective
discretion in its application. Additionally, the Court switching its analysis to begin
with the rule at issue instead of the statute will have implications as to who has
standing to bring these hypothetical future claims, and the avenues through which
they will make it before the Court. Regardless of the answers to these questions, a
subtle change in the Court’s analysis such as this will certainly reshape the balance
and separations of federal power.

